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Images o f Technology in Sociology: 
Computer as Butterfly and Bat
B E R N  W A R D  J O E R G E S
More than fifty years have passed since Robert Merton formulated, 
in his doctoral dissertation on Science, Technology and Society in 
Seventeenth-Century England, what he later, in his “Shandean Post­
script,” came to call the “kindle cole” principle: the “sociological 
discovery of the distorting effects of public (as distinct from private) 
polemics among men of science.”1 According to the kindle cole (or 
“Hooke-Newton-Merton”) principle of scientific polemics, scientists 
ought to avoid engaging in public controversies and try to insulate 
themselves from the responses of the “excitable crowd,” both scientific 
and other.
Social scientists’ attempts to come to grips with computer technol­
ogy provide a line example of both the inevitability and the calamities 
of becoming entangled in the “management of meaning out there.” 
How to solve the dilemma? As Merton demonstrates, “there are 
almost as many ways to insulate truthseekers from the mob as there 
are to skin the eat.”2 If the remarks offered here on sociologists’ use 
of computer rhetoric may sound polemical at times, this is not meant 
to “kindle cole” but rather to draw a slightly different line between 
sociological, technological, and public discourse than that followed by 
those whom 1 shall call “new sociologists of technology.”
In a series of essays written some time ago, David Edge looked at 
the social power o f  technological metaphors. Drawing on such exam­
ples of Dm kheimian social anthropology as Mary Douglas’s Natural
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Symbols and Environments at Risk, he concentrated on images oI society 
taken “like the cybernetic metaphor . . . from the ‘hardware’ of 
control technologies,” which then play a role in "establishing and 
reinforcing moral and social control.”3 In his rather gloomy view, such 
metaphors serve to foster mainly one reaction to our present-day 
social problems: to conclude that the existing institutions are defective 
and more “centralized controls” are therefore needed.4 Edge evokes 
the “priesthood” metaphor for scientific elites, citing Ralph Lapp’s 
dark version of the technological predicament: “We are aboard a train 
which is gathering speed, racing down a track on which there are an 
unknown number of switches leading to unknown destinations. No 
single scientist is in the engine cab, and there may be demons at the 
switch.”5 And he advises one to be wary of control metaphors taken 
from technological parlance in debates about contemporary “crises.”
Whereas Edge’s concern is very much with the conservative, 
reconfirming role that control metaphors have in public talk, the 
following comments focus on the uncertain role of metaphors for 
technology in the professional talk of sociologists.6 But the overall 
context is the same: Images of technology, as advanced in the 
cybernetic sciences, are very much linked to underlying social theo-
204 Bernward Joerges
’David Edge, “Technological Metaphor and Social Control,” in G. Bugliarello and 
D. B. Doner, eds., The History and Philosophy of Technology (Urbana, III., 1973), pp. 
309—24, 310; see Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols (London, 1970), and Implicit Meanings: 
Essays in Anthropology (London, 1975), pp. 230-48.
4Edge (n. 3 above), p. 319.
'Ralph E. Lapp. The New Priesthood: The Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York, 
1973), p. 29.
'“Metaphor” is used synonymously with “image,” as in images of technology. For some 
time now, social-science interest in the power of metaphors to structure experience has 
grown considerably; extensive research, based on Cassirer, Wittgenstein, and later 
structural linguistics, has emerged. For an overview, see A. Ortony. ed.. Metaphor and 
Thought (Cambridge, 1979), and S. Sacks, ed., On Metaphor (Chicago, 1979), e.g.; for an 
analysis of the metaphoric basis of social-scientific theorizing, see Richard H. Brown, A 
Poetic for Sociology (New York, 1977); Gareth Morgan, “Paradigms, Metaphors and 
Puzzle Solving in Organizational Theory,” Administrative Science Quarterly 25 (1980): 
605-22, and “More on Metaphor: Why We Cannot Control Tropes in Administrative 
Science," Administratwe Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 601-7; Donald M. McCloskey, The 
Rhetoric of Economics (Madison, 1986). The use of technical metaphors in everyday life 
has been studied well: see Edge (n. 3 above), with ample references; also I Ians I'reicr, 
“Uber das Dominantwerden technischer Kategorien in der Lebenswell der indnslri- 
ellen Gesellschaft,” Akademie der Wissenschaften und der l.ileitiltn 7 (1961): 15;
Alexander Demandt, Metaphern fur Geschichte (Munich, 1978), I his is mil die i use lor 
the metaphorics of the engineering sciences; see, huwrvei, Kill I W Denln li, “M echa­
nism, Organism and Society: Some Models in Nalimil mill Sin Ini Si lem e." Philosophy of 
Science 18 (1951); 230—52; also I lans-Dielei Hrtlll, Phn dm I'nigung nut Miimhiiien 
(Tiibingcn, 1983).
ries. And such theories have in turn become powerful elements of 
popular culture as well as of sociological images of society and 
historical interpretations of culture.
Considering that scientists and technologists at times misuse their 
public credit as creators of complex machineries by venturing far- 
reaching interpretations of societal processes, I find it appropriate to 
preface my subject proper—sociologists’ images of technology, in 
particular “the computer”—with a few remarks on computer scien­
tists’ images of their proper subject.
Metaphors of Technology in Computer Science
Ever since the invention of artificial intelligence (AI), controversies 
in computer science about the “nature” of AI machines have persis­
tently hinged on the implicit or explicit question of their likeness to 
human beings (likeness, sometimes softened into similarity, resem­
blance, or mere analogy).7 Interestingly, computer scientists, as much 
as social scientists, philosophers, and popular writers, interpret this 
question as being almost equivalent to the question of people’s 
likeness to computers.8 Earl MacCormac’s “Computational M etaphor” 
points both ways, Pamela McCorduck’s Machines Who Think find their 
correspondents in “people that think.”9 Having previously studied the 
cultural influence of Freudian interpretations of human actions, 
Sherry Turkle notes: “If behind popular fascination with Freudian 
theory there was a nervous, often guilty preoccupation with the self as 
sexual, behind increasing interest in computational interpretations of 
mind is an equally nervous preoccupation with the idea of self as a 
machine.”10
"For a strong and positive view, see John McCarthy, “Ascribing Mental Qualities to 
Machines,” in M. Ringle, ed., Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence (New York, 
1979); for a splendid overview of controversies about the possibilities of computer 
simulation and analog explanation of brain processes, see Daniel C. Dennett, “The 
Logical Geography of Computational Approaches: A View from the East Pole,” in 
M. Brand and R. M. Harnish, eds., The Presentation of Knowledge and Belief (Theson, 
1986), pp. 58-79.
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such as Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (New York, 1984) 
and < Irani Fjermedal, The Tomorrow Makers: A Brave New World of Living Brain Machines 
(New York, 1987); and to discussions such as Earl M. MacCormac, “Men and Machines: 
I lie Computational Metaphor,” Technology in Society 6 (1984): 207-16; and Carl 
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This question of hum ans’ likeness to machines (computers) in turn 
appears in three highly intertwined variants: as an epistemic problem 
of the explicability of human behavior (action?) in terms of natural 
(engineering?) science; as a historical problem of a progressive “ma- 
chinization” of human agency; and as an ethical problem regarding the 
determination of human acts and free will. Turkle poses the question 
mainly in this last sense, but her central notion applies to all three 
versions: “At different points in history this same debate has played on 
different stages. Traditionally a theological issue, in the first quarter 
of this century it was played out in debate about psychoanalysis. In the 
last quarter of this century it looks as though it is going to be played 
out in debate about machines.”11
The opposite theme, of the computer’s likeness to human beings, is, 
of course, an old one. But while discussions in the early times of AI 
machines centered on the imitability of very specific cognitive skills 
(“to win a chess endgame”), they seem since to have entered a new 
phase. Younger computer scientists talk more literally about, and 
believe in, the possibility of creating surrogate brains that merit the 
attribute “creature” or “living.” In his book The Tomorrow Makers, 
Grant Fjerntedal quotes the Carnegie-Mellon robotics specialist Hans 
Moravec: “We are on a threshold of a change in the universe 
comparable to the transition from nonlife to life.” And he also quotes 
a research assistant as saying: “Moravec wants to design a creature, 
and my professor Newell wants to design a creature. We are all, in a 
sense, trying to play God.”12 For the first time, the question of the 
“livingness” or “creatureliness” of machines is not only being critically 
discussed by scientists but asserted. Projected AI machineries are 
placed in an evolutionary context without ado.
This is amplified in popular work on computers. Geoff Simons, for 
instance, writing from the National Computer Centre in England, 
takes a highly benign view: “[T]here is overwhelming evidence that 
we are now witnessing the birth of . . . the indefinitely superior 
creatures that machina sapiens will become!”13
Metaphors of Technology in Social Science
So far, sociology has not had much to say on technology per se. As 
Werner Rammert has shown in some detail, “distance to artefacts” is
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still characteristic of most sociological studies of technology.1'1 This is 
about to change, however, in a lively social-constructivist research 
scene that has come much closer.15 Interestingly, a growing concern in 
the sociology of science and technology for freestanding artifacts 
tends to center on computers, too. But the concentration on comput­
ers, and the approaches taken, can hardly be understood without a 
review of the way technology has been treated in received social 
science. Before taking a closer look at more recent sociological 
conceptualizations, one may cast a short glance, therefore, at the way 
ordinary social experience with technology and its metaphors has 
permeated social-science intercourse with technology in the past.
People have always breathed “life” into their creations—think of the 
powerful myth of Pygmalion. Conversely, they have always been 
afraid that their products may win power over them, that the 
relationship between humans and machines may in some deadly way 
be inverted—think of the Golem theme, or Frankenstein and his 
monster. In the interaction between man and oeuvre, between crea­
ture and created, the topos of life and death plays a very important 
role.
Not surprisingly, the life-death m etaphor has been at the root of 
social-science interaction with industrial technology, too, and the 
history of this interpretative frame deserves a separate analysis. A few 
observations may suffice here, starting with the central Marxian 
image of living work as a generic term for all human activity and dead 
work for machine activity. The m etaphor is echoed in Max Weber’s 
formulation: “A lifeless machine is reified mind. It is only this that gives 
it the power to force humans into its service and to dominate their 
daily working life to the extent to which this is effectively the case in 
the factory. Reified mind is also that living machine represented by 
bureaucratic organization.”,b Bureaucracy is portrayed here as living, 
perhaps because it was less obviously machine-operated in Weber’s 
lime. But is administration via the written word not bureaucratic rule 
mediated by a particular information and communication technol-
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ogy? Note, also, the intellectual influence of Jurgen Habermas’s 
categories of system versus life world; again the image of life and 
death is powerfully at work—and “bureaucracy” no longer stands for 
“living.”
A related metaphor that regains acuity in contemporary interpre­
tations of microelectronic information processing was the opposition 
of mind and soul (e.g., Ludwig Klages). Here, soul represented the 
vital source of human activity; mind, the cerebral alienation from this 
source. The mind becomes the enemy of all that has life—its product, 
technology, the medium of a deadly counterprinciple. The soul-mind 
juxtaposition seems to relate back to what (in the classical worldview) 
was the more fundamental one of life-death through the metaphorics 
of hand and head: manual work as living productive work; nonm an­
ual work as exploitative work and work intended to replace living by 
dead work—the generating of technology.
The list of such mutually related root metaphors can easily be 
extended: woman (life, soul)-man (death, mind); east-west; day 
(sun)-night (moon); above-below; yin and yang. More or less clandes­
tinely, they all inspire recurring attempts to achieve a reculturization 
of science in the face of a “crisis of the sciences” and apparently 
overpowering technology. It seems, then, that the social sciences have 
persistently dealt with modern technology, and continue to do so, in 
the light of manifold metaphors through which reality is interpreted 
as a series of juxtapositions of fundamental forces and principles. 
Technology almost always emerges as peculiarly ambiguous, involved 
in a tangled way in both domains, even though, all things said, 
predominantly as an element of secularization and disenchantment.
This interpretative tradition is continued in contemporary social- 
science arguments critical of computers. Computing machinery is 
often seen as a new type of technology, wholly different in quality 
from traditional industrial technology. At the same time, it is made 
into an incomparably more powerful vehicle of a countervailing 
unnatural and life-threatening principle: computer technology as the 
medium of an even more far-reaching machinization, digitalization, 
algorithmization, moral-affective devastation, and expropriation of 
human capabilities.
Unlike the computer sciences, though, the social sciences’ preoccu­
pation with technology has remained on highly interpretative, meta­
phoric levels. Except for ergonomics, it has contributed little to the 
actual shaping of machinery. And only a few scholars have focused 
their conceptual work on the constitution of things and, more 
specifically, of technical artifacts. Those who have done so have had no 
great effect on social-science theorizing.
Where this road has been taken, however, interesting parallels 
appear. Jean Piaget, for instance, devoted much of his work to 
studying the development of action coordinations relating to the 
physical, outside world and the constitution of things in action. He 
identified consecutive extended accommodative (objectifying) and as­
similative (subjectifying) processes in the construction (as we would 
say today) of both the actor and that which is acted upon. From the 
way children build up their external world, he later derived essential 
arguments that led to a theory of epistemic structures such as logic 
and mathematics in his genetic epistemology.17 Ernst E. Boesch, a 
cultural psychologist, generalizes such considerations to cultural 
evolution at large, studying the transformations of animistic forms of 
thing constitution into more rationalized forms.18 Again, spirals, as it 
were, of objectifications and subjectifications, under the primacy of 
the latter, are postulated.
Simplifying and generalizing greatly, I suggest that evidence drawn 
from animists, children, and natural scientists19 (a fourth group 
would, of course, be psychotics)20 has led to peculiarly similar expla­
nations. Social scientists approaching the constitution of (material- 
technical) artifacts in an empirical-analytical m anner have pointed out 
progressions of attribution and denial of sentience, of animation and 
neutralization of technical objects, reflecting a continuous dialectic of 
cultural, personal, and scientific cognitive-emotional processes. In­
vesting technology with human or superhum an qualities, be they 
demonic or eudemonic, can be understood as strategies for “reassim­
ilating” (Piaget) problematic rationalizations and resulting disen- 
chantments.
In sum, then, a root metaphor of life and death in the social 
sciences (where technology stands for death) peculiarly contrasts with 
an evolutionary root metaphor (where technology becomes an emer­
gent life-form) in computer sciences. Sociologists turning to an 
empirical study of computer phenomena encounter deep-seated 
interpretative differences in the two scientific cultures. Not only are
'(Jean Piaget, Introduction a I’epistemologie genetique (Paris, 1950).
'“Ernst E. Boesch, Psychopathologie des Alltags. Zur Okopsychologie des Handelns und seiner 
Stiirungen (Bern, 1979).
'"Sherry Turkle herself begins her argument with the wolf child of 1800 and carries 
il ihrough to the worldviews of AI scientists. She also mentions that not only Marvin 
Minsky, Joel Moses, Gerald Sussman, and other legendary AI scientists but also John 
von Neumann and Norbert Wiener believed themselves descendants of Rabbi Loew,
11valor of Golem (Turkle [n. 8 above], p. 260).
""See, e.g., Bruno Bettelheim, “Joey: A Mechanical Boy,’’ Scientific American, March 
1959, pp. 2—9. or Robert W. Daly, “The Specters of Technicism,” Psychiatry: Journal for 
the Study o/ /nlnpcisotiul Processes 33 (1970): 4 17 — 31.
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these differences difficult to reconcile, there are hardly any elabo­
rated research traditions for empirically analyzing the social constitu­
tion of things. As the social sciences have unfolded into disciplines, 
technology as an element of material culture has almost vanished 
from sociological conceptualizations. But the excommunication of 
tangible artifacts and their aggregates from sociological theory and 
their categorization as subject matter of “the other culture” (the 
natural and engineering sciences) become untenable, so it would 
seem, in the face of the computer.
Computer Metaphors
While sociologists have long taken little notice analytically of 
technical artifacts—the hard core of technological systems—some new 
sociologists of technology begin to accord to complex material- 
technical artifacts a systematic conceptual status. Computing machin­
ery plays a prominent role here, often justified (while being a matter 
of funding, too) by the unique character of these machines. This 
reflects lively extrascientific debates in which radical departures from 
traditional industrial social forms have widely come to be symbolized 
by “the computer.”
Hence, though machines in general are discussed in the following, 
the focus is on advanced artifacts capable of the programmed 
processing of surprisingly large amounts of electrical “signals” at 
surprising speed—said by their designers to be endowed with artificial 
intelligence. Note that the programs of such machines, so-called 
software, are not treated here as somehow “immaterial” but rather as 
integral parts of the material artifact.21 The categorical distinction that 
social scientists commonly make between “material hardware” and 
“immaterial software” seems quite unwarranted. In engineering 
terms, the line between hard and soft is an entirely pragmatic matter. 
The difference between the two comes down to the different technical 
parlances that engineers, computer scientists, and technicians use for 
“their” machine components. Any specialist language has its own 
rhetoric. For obvious reasons the metaphors of software talk are more 
human than those for hardware talk, and software talk lends itself 
more easily to “ideologization” and mythologizing association with 
supermetaphors.
^Exchangeable control mechanisms have been built into machines for ages; see Otto 
Mayr, Aurtori/y, Liberty and Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe (Baltimore, I9S7). 
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clocklike apparatus.
Sherry Turkle’s description of computer languages provides a good 
example. LISP, for instance, has often been presented as the language 
of liberalization, as opposed to bureaucratic slave languages: “To the 
eyes of the hacker, business languages, for example the IBM lan­
guages FORTRAN and COBOL, and the ‘scientific’ language PAS­
CAL, have come to represent the uniformity of mass culture that 
buries the individual in the crowd. In ‘Software Wars’ [a popular 
hacker drama modeled on Star Wars films] these appear as the 
languages appropriate to the totalitarian rule of ‘the Empire.’ LISP is 
the language of pleasure, of individuality, a language that facilitates a 
way of thinking where . . .  ‘it is easy to live in the world of Godel, 
Escher, Bach.’ ”22 Similarly, personal computer (PC) connoisseurs 
propagate different images for different computer makes. IBM PCs 
are hierarchical command machines, “the Pentagon in a shoebox”; 
Apple Ils are alternative machines, useful and designed for cooper­
ative and creative activities outside bureaucratic and corporate con­
texts.
Such images are far removed from the reality of electronic combi­
nation devices; they belong to the category of ideology. This is not to 
say that their study is irrelevant to the present discussion. On the 
contrary, it means only that adopting such software ideologies for the 
construction of social-science concepts of Al technology predeter­
mines images of technology that are, as I will try to show, analytically 
problematic and practically misleading.23
Computer as Butterfly and, Bat
The image of butterfly and bat came to me while reading The Second 
Self, hitherto the most ambitious empirical (ethnographic) study of 
the cultural implications of computer technology. In an earlier essay, 
“Computer as Rorschach,” Turkle had already formulated her central 
thesis: Computers are projective objects, akin to Rorschach tests, 
those inkblots designed by a Swiss psychiatrist in order to reconstruct, 
on the basis of their interpretations, the inner world of respondents.24
“Turkic (n. 8 above), pp. 225-26.
'A reverse misapprehension of the nature of electronic machinery can be found in 
social studies that remain fixated on hardware (installed components like transistors, 
integrated circuits, and microprocessors) and therefore on inventions and innovations 
at the level o f inalei ials and production technologies, related corporate strategies, state 
anti user interests, and the like. See, e.g., Jost Halftnann, Die Enlstehung der Mihroelek- 
liintili ( f iankfut i, 1985), who excludes software as an immaterial component and does 
ttol even mention the contributions o f logic and mathematics to computer develop­
ment < )tte looks in vain lot names like 'fining, von Neumann, Boole, Shannon, or 
Wienci to the indexes ol sut It hooks,
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B iillc i dies and hats are common interpretations in the Rorschach 
lests, and I use them, in turn, for interpreting sociological images of 
let hnology.
Like any proper metaphor, this one is meant to evoke several 
interpretations. In the first place, it stands for the “projectivity” of 
machine technology, quite in tune with Turkle’s initial notion that 
technologies are manifestations of cultural projects. Beyond this, I use 
it to indicate the “dual face,” the ambiguity of technology as a 
pervasive motif of social-science interpretations of technology. Last, 
however, bat and butterfly stand for the “fluttering” approach some 
sociologists take—now coquettish and seductive, now frightening and 
aversive—in dealing with the new machines.
In this last sense, my main argum ent concerns the way that 
metaphors of the field, supercharged with meaning, are put to 
conceptual uses, as a theoretical resource for a sociological study of 
technology.25
New Sociologists of Technology
In his famous paper, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” 
Alan Turing—not a sociologist by far—-has answered the eminently 
social question “Can machines think?” with a behavioristically qual­
ified “Yes!” And yet at least two arguments in his text do not accord 
with behaviorist creed. It is, says Turing, common, in order to avoid 
endless discussions about who can think, “to have the polite conven­
tion that everyone does.”26 And even before that he ventures a 
prediction of far-reaching importance for the problem at hand: “At 
the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion 
will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines 
thinking without expecting to be contradicted.”27 Hidden in Turing’s 
classically cool text is then a “subtext” that points to the social 
construction of reality (including machinery) via the use of language
“This is certainly not to doubt the importance of metaphoric understanding. On the 
contrary, Jerome Bruner's advice not to underestimate the power of “just metaphoric” 
knowledge in creative thinking applies even more to scientific creativity. Even so, 1 
would prefer to continue entertaining the thought that creative scientists, especially in 
the analysis of scientific-technological developments, should (try to) aim at what Bruner 
calls producing “effective surprise” through empirical clarification rather than through 
metaphorical invention. Jerome S. Bruner, “The Conditions of Creativity,” in H. E. 
Gruber, G. Terrel, and M. Wertheimer, eds., Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking 
(New York, 1962); see also Bernward Joerges, “Wissenschaftliche K reativ ita tZeitschrift 
fur allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 8 (1978): 384—404.
“Alan M. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Mind 59 (195(1): 
433-60, 446.
-’Ibid., p. 142.
and common talk.28 Machines will think when people believe they 
think. I assume, for the purpose of further discussion, that the beliefs 
of sociologists are not entirely negligible in this matter.
Confronted with computers, some sociologists have decided to 
ignore machines no longer. Some apparatus can evidently perform 
operations that traditionally were thought to merit the human at­
tribute “mental.” One finds that old questions about the life and death 
of things are no longer asked only by children and premoderns but 
also by an elite of scientists. In view of the transferability of mental 
processes to new machines, those who construct and explain them 
prominently enter debates about the nature and meaning of human 
life. Should this not concern sociology? In what sense? Surely in some 
way related to social action. I will try to trace this newly awakened 
interest by referring to four sociologists who have recently advanced 
conceptualizations of machinery that go beyond traditional ap­
proaches: Sherry Turkle, Michel Calion, Steve Woolgar, and Randall 
Collins.29
Sherry Turkle, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (in 
Daniel Dennett’s words, the “Vatican City of High Church Computa- 
tionalism” in AI research), proceeds from a strict analogy between the 
cultural power of Freudian psychoanalytic constructs and the cultural 
influence of computers. Both are seen as “evocative objects” that 
“catalyze” dramatic changes in our thoughts, emotions, and actions.
Turkle unravels the way in which the two antipodal groups of chil­
dren (including girls) and AI theoreticians (all males) confront com­
puters. She shows that dealing with these machines actualizes funda­
mental philosophical issues: What is it to be human? For example, 
computers seem to force members of both groups to revise their 
culturally or philosophically taken-for-granted ontologies: hierarchies 
like “stones—plants—animals—humans,” built on schemes like 
“nonliving—living—sentient—rational,” become tangled. How can 
new order be achieved where apparently nonliving objects obviously 
do perform rationally? Should humans and machines move closer to 
each other as opposed to less noble creatures? But no, are humans not 
part of all living creation, high or low, essentially superior to anything 
artificial, including seemingly noble—because mentally endowed—AI 
machines? What are the grounds on which to build a new, consistent 
hierarchy? Turkle fascinatingly introduces us to the epistemic struggles
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and solutions of small children, adolescents, hackers, hobbyists, play­
ers, and computer scientists—and their metaphors.
How does she herself conceptualize this material? In the first place, 
she has a thesis that computers are machines of an extraordinary, 
unique kind because, unlike other technologies, they leave endless 
room for their users’ desires, projections, and intentions. But it seems 
to me that she also allows respondents to seduce her into conceptu­
alizing “the computer,” just as they do, as a challenging and dem and­
ing counteractor of humans. “We cede to the computer the power of 
reason, but at the same time, in defense, our sense of identity becomes 
increasingly focused on the soul and the spirit in the human 
machine.”30
In a twofold way, Turkle’s interpretation of computers is well 
reflected in the image of the butterfly. On the one hand, she is largely 
optimistic about the cultural and social changes opening up with the 
appearance of this technology:
As I have worked on this book I have often been asked, “Are 
computers good or bad?” . . . No one asks whether relationships 
with people are good or bad in general. Rather we seek out the 
information to build our own model of a particular relationship. 
Only then do we make judgments about I lie possible effects of the 
relationship. We have long experience with ibis kind of model 
building of relationships between people, but we are only begin­
ning to think in this more textured way about our relationships with 
technology. Computers tire not good or bad; I hey tire powerful. It 
is a commonplace to say that they tire powerful in their instru­
mental use. I he modes of relating to computers and the opposi­
tions I list1 . . . are a contribution to understanding the computer’s 
subjective power in a more nuanced way."
Note in this passage the analogy (homology?) between relationships to 
computers and to people. What is more, computers are seen as 
potentially friendly partners. Turkle differs here from social scientists 
who have drawn rather dark and at times pandemonic pictures. Not 
really a bat, the computer, in Turkle’s version.
On the other hand, Turkle’s analyses remain somewhat lofty, 
swaying as it were between projections offered “out there” and 
conventional conceptual repertoires. Also, at no point does she deal 
with other “evocative” artifacts, and she seems to ignore that new 
mechanisms, transported from one cultural context to another, have 
always raised existential issues.
“ Turkle (n. 8 above), p. 312, 
’’Ibid., p. 322, em phasis added.
Do we not know, from social anthropology or research in develop­
ing countries, that technologies transferred from one culture to a very 
different one cease for some time to be technologies in a specifiable 
sense? Their status as systems of action becomes uncertain. They are 
experienced simultaneously as entirely useless or pleasurable in 
themselves and as frightening machinations without any familiar 
value reference or as universal vehicles for fulfilling hitherto unsat­
isfied needs, or again as an ultimate loss of unrenounceable values.
This cultural figuration can be traced generally, from the medical 
syringe in the Congo to nuclear energy, or, today possibly only in its 
beginnings, to AI machines. Pure Funktionslust and naked, unreason­
able fear, wild hopes for a better life and apocalyptic premonitions 
about the end of human civilization lie close together. If  something 
like “pure value realization” (all bat or butterfly) and “pure technol­
ogy” (neutral instrumentality) exists at all, then it exists in these 
moments when technical potential moves from one limiting cultural 
context to another.
Could it be that Turkle’s version of the computer springs, at one 
level, from such transcultural situations? Be that as it may, her 
analyses tend to elevate the alluring, captivating, and bewitching 
experiences with AI machines in society to the status of a crucial 
theoretical construct: “Under pressure from the computer, the ques­
tion of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cullutal 
preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to the Victorians 
threat and obsession, taboo and fascination.”32
Michel Calion works at another high place of technology discourse, 
the Ecole Nationale Superieure des Mines in Paris. In his study Society 
in the Making, he declares engineers to be the heller sociologists. 
Drawing on Tourainian action sociology and British social construc­
tionism, he proposes to reconstruct and appropriate their concepts 
lor an analysis of the constitution of technical artifacts. In order to do 
this he introduces the concept of an “actor-world” and postulates that 
“[W]e must begin with a world that includes nature, society, and the 
obsessions and interests of men (instead of evoking a natural world 
distinct from society). Also we must establish a general map of 
resistances that are met and used by the actors, whoever these actors 
may be (instead of establishing a map limited to social interests).’™
Calion leaves no doubt that he wants to count “natural entities” 
among such actors. “One must abandon the easier, conventional
"Ibid., p. 313.
"Michel Calion, “Society in the Making: The Study of Technology as a Tool for 
Sin iologiial Analysis.” Research paper. Centre de Sociologie (Paris, 1984), p. 23, 
emphasis added. (In a shorter version, the study appears in Bijker et al. [n. 15 above], 
pp. H3 103.)
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analysis that tends to constrain [these] relationships within a tight 
corset of sociological categories.”” Taking his empirical material from 
a case study of the aborted project to develop an advanced electric 
vehicle for Electricite de France (EDF), in a race with Renault’s plans 
to develop “Le Car,” Calion does not discuss AI in this study. But his 
plea for borrowing participant actors’—particularly engineers’— 
concepts is unusually explicit.35
Having described the social background of the controversial R&D 
project in conventional fashion, Calion proceeds:
Up to this point, the entities reviewed are familiar to the 
sociologist. One finds consumers, social movements, and minis­
terial services. But it would be an error to dose the inventory. 
There are also accumulators, fuel cells, electrodes, electrons, 
catalysts, and electrolytes. For, if the electrons do not play their 
part or the catalysts become contaminated, the result would not 
be any less disastrous than if the users find the new vehicle 
repulsive, the new regulations are not administered, or Renault 
stubbornly decides to develop “le Car.” In the world defined and 
constructed by EDF, at least three new entities that play an 
essential role must be added: the zn/air accumulators, the lead 
accumulators, and the fuel cells with their cohort of associated 
elements (catalysts, electrons, etc.).36
An important concept in this view is that of conflict, and in the event 
of success, a mutual balance of power between “the elements of the 
actor-world.” Calion asks, for instance, whether the potential buyers 
of a technology are easier to influence “than the electrons moving 
between the two electrodes of the cell, or the world market of 
platinum.”37
I will not discuss further the conceptual difficulties this raises. The 
critical point seems to be that Calion seriously proposes to conceptu­
alize, next to “social,” “natural actors,” and to replace voluntaristic 
concepts such as “interests,” which could not easily be generalized to 
natural actors, with “resistance.” The switching of terms, for both 
kinds of actors, is made peculiarly suggestive by placing it in the 
context of Touraine’s political sociology and its imagery. (John Law 
undertakes to further ground Calion’s approach within a “non-
MIbid„ p. 42.
35In the meantime, the group around Michel Calion and Bruno Latour have 
themselves moved into computer-related research.
“Calion (n. 33 above), p. 26.
’’Ibid., p. 45.
reductionist sociology.” His technical star is a sailing ship, the Portu­
guese caravel, which, in battle against mighty natural actors such as 
Cape Bojador on the African Atlantic, helped to carry forward 
Portuguese maritime expansion.)38
Are natural actors good or bad, heroes or scoundrels, butterflies or 
bats? With Calion this seems to depend largely on who manages to 
overcome their resistance and win their cooperation. In the electric 
vehicle he doubtless sees a pretty butterfly (even if it did not unfold). 
Just as clearly, Le Car is an ugly bat. As with sociology in general, this 
author’s preferences are not entirely irrelevant to his analysis.
Steve Woolgar, at Brunel University, belongs to the group of pre­
dominantly British sociologists of science who have mounted, over the 
past ten or fifteen years, the most forceful attack against traditional 
theories of science. From positions variously labeled ethnomethod- 
ological, phenomenological, social-constructivist, interpretative, or 
discourse analytical, the ideological nature of orthodox methodolo­
gies of science was revealed by providing evidence for the view that 
observations, conjectures, and refutations in scientific research are as 
culture dependent, interest driven, situated, and highly negotiable as 
elsewhere in social life. In Laboratory Life, a study on neuroendocri­
nological research, Woolgar and Bruno Latour had already suggested 
that there exists “an essential similarity between the inscription 
capabilities of apparatus, the manic passion for marking, coding, and 
filing, and the literary skills of writing, persuasion, and discussion.” 
Science, too, is a form of literary inscription.39
The attribution of inscription capabilities to scientific apparatus 
seems to foreshadow Woolgar’s explicit program, in his paper “Why 
Not a Sociology of Machines?” for treating computers as subjects.40 
The argument is modeled on neo-Wittgensteinian, post-Kuhnian 
“shifts in epistemological preconceptions” concerning the nature of 
scientific knowledge and practice. Just as the new sociology of science 
must transcend the distinction between cognitive and social in order 
lo reveal these and similar dichotomies as scientists’ stratagems to 
perpetuate a privileged image of their enterprise, so must a sociology 
of AI not “adopt the distinctions, concepts and assumptions of AI 
discourse.”" In Woolgar’s view, the basic feature of AI discourse is the
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distinction between man and machine in terms of intelligence and 
nonintelligence, justified in turn by a “distinction between the meta­
physical and the epistemological.” Taking his examples from the 
development of expert systems, he interprets the AI discourse42 as 
entrepreneurial:
By virtue of their “political” skills . . . certain individuals have 
become highly effective salespersons. In particular, they have 
mobilized the distinction between man and machine in claiming 
their own particular (human) expertise to speak about expert 
systems (machines). They thus define the nature and character of 
the object of study, they establish that these are indeed the proper 
objects of investigation and they claim to be uniquely competent 
in speaking on behalf of these objects. The rest of us are obliged 
to defer to what these privileged spokesmen have to say about 
expert systems . . . they establish themselves as experts on the 
social order of expert systems. . . . [O]ur uncritical adoption of 
the man-machine distinction would amount to compliance with 
the arguments of the entrepreneurs.4’
Woolgar proceeds by distinguishing options for a sociology for and 
of AI, depending on “our preconceptions about the nature of 
machines and human behaviour and . . .  on whether we construe of 
machines as subjects or objects of sociological analysis.” He finds a 
“sociology of the AI community” wanting because not much could be 
learned about AI researchers’ products. And he continues:
[W]e can adopt the more current sociology of science position 
that the products of AI research are socially constructed. Under 
this rubric one would develop a sociology of the characterization, 
design and use of intelligent machines; the machines would be 
portrayed as socially constituted objects. Note, however, that this 
approach grants priority to humans as constructing agents, and this 
implicitly adopts the key distinction between humans and machines which 
pervades AI discourse. . . . [Another] sociology of AI would 
construe intelligent machines as the subjects of study. There seem 
no difficulties of principle in using standard sociological methods 
in this approach. . . . [T]his project will only strike us as bizarre to 
the extent that we are unwilling to grant human intelligence to 
intelligent machines.44
42“ ‘Dis-cursus'—originally the action of running here and there, coming and going, 
measures taken. ‘pl°ts and plans,' ” as Roland Barthes puts it in A Lover's Discourse (New 
York, 1981), p. 3.
"W oolgar (n. 10 above), p. 500.
"Ibid., p. 507, emphasis added.
In a way, this seems to be what Woolgar proposes, shedding 
questions like “Are artificially intelligent machines sufficiently like 
humans to be treated as the subjects of sociological inquiry? Or, to 
reverse the more usual query, in what sense can we continue to 
presume that human intelligence is not artificial?” But he goes one 
step further and argues that both approaches still “involve the implicit 
adoption of the human-machine distinction”: “[W]e need to eschew 
approaches which are unnecessarily parasitic of participants’ dichot­
omies, and develop a sociological approach which takes as its focus the 
human/mechanical language community; the community composed 
of ‘expert machines and machine experts.’ ”*
On the other hand, however, Woolgar stops short of assigning 
sociologists a practical role in the construction of AI machines, 
doubting the willingness of “neo-Wittgensteinians” to allow their 
arguments to be codified and programmed in the computationalist- 
cognitivist languages of AI™ In this sense, he does not keep up with 
the radical thrust of some sociologists of science who would see 
sociologists in a role similar to that of engineers struggling with 
natural actors.
One important aspect of this program would be to substantiate 
Woolgar’s claim that AI practitioners do not in fact “talk INTELLI­
GENCE,” that is, do not doubt that machines can think and talk, just 
as researchers do not, if one trusts laboratory research, “talk SCI­
ENCE” or truth. Another aspect would be to find out just how the 
public spokespersons of AI “respond to the argum ent that the 
achievements of AI should not be evaluated in terms of their 
relevance for ‘intelligence’ or any other ‘mental’ phenomena.” Corre­
spondingly, Woolgar concludes, we should take AI machines as an 
occasion for “reassessing the central axiom of sociology that there is something 
distinctly ‘social’ about human behaviour.”*1
It would be too easy to counter this sophisticated scheme by saying 
that it might be too rash to strip human activity of the sole right to the 
epithet “social” in order to be able to ascribe the status of subjects to 
intelligent machines. Woolgar’s central interest here—to open up 
nonhuman phenomena, insulated by their proponents, to sociological 
inquiry—is far too important, as is his query about the extent to which 
we can “deve lop a sociological study of the human/mechanical lan­
guage community where the ‘machines’ in question are, say, bicycles,
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missiles, or food processors.”48 But I wonder whether his analysis is 
not a bit tangled or even upside down. (So much for butterflies and 
bats.)
The crucial distinction—people versus machines—may not just be a 
“strategic practice of members of the AI community.” Carl Mitcham 
concludes from his survey that today there is a consensus among 
philosophers that machines cannot think, while computer scientists do 
not agree.49 W hether in the guise of the computational metaphor, the 
computer as person image50 (with Marvin Minsky even as a society of 
actors), or of the evolutionary metaphor, the collapsing of the 
distinction is an achievement of the cybernetic sciences themselves. 
And notwithstanding his own repeated admonitions to assert sociol­
ogy’s right to deal with machines by not falling into the traps of AI 
proponents’ self-interested metaphysics, Woolgar not only appeals to 
AI practitioners’ suspected nonadherence to the distinction but, in the 
end, explicitly to theoretical AI discourse itself: “Hitherto abstract 
concerns in the philosophy of the social sciences can now be broached 
empirically by reference to the recent attempts of AI researchers to probe the limit 
of the distinction between human behaviour and machine activity. Thus the 
question of whether there are essential differences between humans 
and machines can be addressed with respect to attempts to develop a 
subclass of machines which are, arguably, endowed with a human 
capability, intelligence.”31
Randall Collins, of the University of California, anchored in a solid 
old-European sociological tradition and, all the same, gifted with the 
talent of synthesizing a proliferation of unorthodox and heterodox 
developments in sociology, has recently joined the debate. In an essay 
on the state and vitality of the discipline—“Is 1980s Sociology in a 
Doldrums?”—he analyzes promising vistas.32 Not that he would count
“ Ibid., p. 568. For a similar plea to embrace all technical artifacts within a semiotic 
approach, see Jim Johnson’s (alias Bruno Latour’s) delightful “Mixing Humans and 
Nonhumans Together: The Sociology of a Door-Closer,” Social Problems 35 (1988): 
298-310.
“Mitcham (n. 8 above), p. 171; in fact, Woolgar’s main witnesses for the stark 
dichotomy are not bred-in-the-bone computer scientists.
’"Not Computer as Poison, as Stuart Brand titled an issue of his Whole Earth Review 
(December 1984/January 1985); for an unusually outspoken plea to conceptualize 
computers as persons, not only to understand better but to actually design better 
computers, see Lars-Erik Janlert, “The Computer as a Person,''Journalfor the Theory of 
Social Behaviour 17 (1987): 321-41. From the philosophical viewpoint, the problems of 
this commitment have been exposed early in the debate by Donald MacKay; see, e.g., 
“The Use of Behavioural Language to Refer to Mechanical Processes,” British Journal /or 
the Philosophy of Science 13 (1962): 89-103.
’'Woolgar (n. 40 above), p. 568, emphasis added.
■’!Randall Collins, "Is 1980s Sociology in a Doldrums?” American /niirnal ofSociolom 9 1 
(1986): 1336-55.
approaches to science and technology among them; those are not 
even mentioned. Apart from methodological and theory-strategic 
issues, he dwells mainly on gender and a new sociology of emotions. 
It is in this latter context that his only reference to technology appears.
According to Collins, a future sociology of emotions will have major 
consequences for social-science developments. “The time is ripening 
for a theoretical upheaval . . .  as we have to come to grips with the 
grounding of language not only in cognitive aspects of social interac­
tion but in what may turn  out to be its emotional interactional 
substrate.” And he continues:
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One of the payoffs of this is likely to be a practical contribution to the 
development of Artificial Intelligence. It is becoming increasingly 
clear that individualistic psychology has not cracked the code that 
will open the way to a computer that can think and talk like a human 
being, and AI leaders are already turning to cognitive sociologists, 
including ethnomethodological ones, for a better lead. It may be 
one of the ironies of the 1990s (or possibly another decade 
thereafter) that one of the most ivory-tower branches of our 
discipline will turn out to be connected with sociology’s most 
notable practical applications, the achievement of high-level 
artificial intelligence. ’ ’
A computer that can think and speak like a human being—Collins does 
not specify the meaning he wishes to give to the term “like.” But read in 
context, he, too, seems to have a homology rather than an analogy in 
mind. Note also that he adds talking to the capability of thinking.
This invites two observations. First, Collins surpasses the central AI 
debate, where emotionality is made a nobler attribute of humankind 
than intelligence. The road to functional AI machines will be opened 
by simulating emotionality, or at least the linkages between cognition 
and emotion. Second, the tone is distinctly euphoric: sociology may at 
last unfold as a really practical science. Responding to criticism from 
Norman Denzin, Collins reaffirms: “My argum ent [was] that, if AI is 
ever going to be successful, it will have to be done by sociologists, who 
incorporate precisely the bodily situated, emotional, situationally 
negotiated aspects of real human intelligence.”54
The lieenchantment of the Disenchanted
Sociology has rediscovered freestanding artifacts, mainly (and 
maybe regrettably so) in the form of computers. All at once, these
’’Ibid , p 131*1. ruiph.isis .hided
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machines are made into something like social actors, and sociology is 
expected to take them seriously as such. What has happened?
Ethnographic research, in combination with a more or less radical 
epistemological relativism (not in Collins’s case, though), is impressed 
with the finding that computers are “constructed” as creatures, as 
counteractors, as rational and powerful, in any case somehow auton­
omous, actors. Special significance is attributed to the fact that such 
notions are seriously entertained, not only in everyday life or public 
imagery but also in theoretical and applied science and engineering 
discourse. What is more, images of—say—humane machines are 
painted in generally optimistic colors by their inventors and 
constructors—not least by the most prominent among them.
But why should sociologists of technology begin to appropriate such 
interpretations as theoretical resources? It seems to me that a certain 
intellectual flutter is building up—at first glance, light and elegant; at 
second glance, rather batty. (To repeat: the argum ent is not wholesale 
against taking over metaphors of the field; rather, in McCloskey’s 
words, “[s]elf-consciousness about metaphor would be an improve­
ment on many counts. Most obviously, unexamined metaphor is a 
substitute for thinking—which is a recommendation to examine the 
metaphors, not to attempt the impossible by banishing them .”)3’ So­
ciologists who argue along such lines unwittingly may be entering into 
the strange business of a “reenchantment of disenchantment.”
The historical process of disenchantment, in Max Weber’s under­
standing of the term, is closely linked to the capability (and admiss- 
ability) of experimentally decontextualizing material objects and 
events, according to a program of science oriented since the Renais­
sance toward technological control. Decoupling natural processes dis­
ciplined in apparatus (“socially normated natural events,” as Norbert 
Elias calls it, talking about time and clocks)56 from those normative and 
symbolic contexts that orient social interaction is part and parcel 
of this program and its manifestations. Rather successfully, if not 
linearly, such operations have been subsumed under their own proper 
norms and symbols—scientific and technical ones. Relevant normative 
orientations are, among others, the good to be had from being able to 
freely repeat, calculate, control, expand, and refine appropriate
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operations; and, above all, to achieve thereby a splendid indifference 
toward activities that cannot be “normated,” symbolized, and kept 
under control in this manner.
The power of these orientations is great and not without its own 
magic. Yet, periodic disillusionments are just as great: irritations and 
disturbances not only in society’s natural metabolism but also in the 
maintenance of ultimately more powerful orientations. T hat is why 
attempts at relativizing past decontextualization and disenchantment, 
at resubjectivation in the sense suggested above with reference to 
Piaget and Boesch, will always occur and will certainly be more 
marked in times of desultory technical change.
Sociologists are involved in this process willy-nilly. They always take 
part in the recontextualization of the technologies they study. Sociol­
ogy cannot offer a “meta-discourse” that itself is insulated from 
technology. This is why distancing and self-critical control of unavoid­
able and unwitting involvement seemed appropriate for a social 
science rooted in the Enlightenment and oriented to an ethos of 
disenchanting that which can be disenchanted. For the same reason, 
social science rooted in a critique of the Enlightenment has called for 
conscious partisanship and participation in a program of human 
betterment. The new sociologists of technology, it seems, are not 
much pleased with either strategy. Their theoretical recourse to 
everyday images and myths of technology and to engineering-science 
discourse leaves the status of their arguments and their theoretical 
objectives quite uncertain.
Could it be that a Zeitgeist of romancing the machine is getting the 
better of sociologists who are just beginning to venture into the world 
o f  technical things?
But What to Do with AI Machines?
It is true, there is much more “mind in the machine” than is realized 
by sociologists evading concern with machinery. But it is the same 
mind, or spirit, that is in all machines. The fundamental question is 
not 'lu ting ’s “Can machines think?” but rather “Do machines act?” 
Whether soeiologists of technology can escape the noise around the 
"thinking machines” and still come up with a reasonable approach to 
them depends on the way this question is answered. Do machines act? 
Yes, they do in a specific sense. Does this make them actors—subjects? 
Nil, indeed not."
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Computers are, like all machines, devices for decontextualization: 
that is, products of the transmission of specific patterns and processes 
of action, including the calculations underlying them, to freestanding 
artifacts in order to free them from cultural and personal peculiarities 
and differences. In the case of computers, complex logical operations 
are transmitted. In the case of so-called work machines, for instance, 
operations requiring power and manual skills are transmitted. Com­
puters, however, decontextualize in a more sensitive domain than 
other machines, and they can quite universally be linked back to 
human actions. They have, to use Elaine Scarry’s notion, vastly 
greater “leverage.”58 Yet these assertions, seemingly easy to agree on, 
warrant rethinking. What about nuclear plants, space technology, 
engineered organisms? The decontextualizing effects of such tech­
nologies are enormous. If  the responses they elicit from sociologists 
are not similar to those produced by AI machines, it may only be yet 
another indication that sociological images of technology are bor­
rowed from the field without sufficiently being examined within some 
“metalanguage of the social sciences.”59
As pointed out, the history of the discipline explains this well. A 
dematerialized concept of social action in the Weberian tradition, but 
also the esoterics of action a la Niklas Luhmann or the lofty sign 
acrobatics of semiology, has rendered access to real operating machin­
ery difficult or impossible. Machinery in these traditions does not 
represent significant activity and therefore cannot be dealt with 
significantly. What is social about machinery surrounds it; its inner 
social structure remains covert. While the technical sciences have 
advanced further and further into the outer material world, the social 
sciences have moved further and further away from it. The level of 
direct practical concourse with things, where doubts regarding their 
social nature cannot easily arise, has progressively been lost as a level 
for conceptual reference. Entile Durkheim began his Rules with the 
requirement that sociological analyses be performed from things to 
their images, not from images to things: “Living in the midst of 
things, men cannot but make them subject to their thoughts, and 
orient their conduct accordingly. Only because such conceptualiza­
tions are closer to us . . . than the realities from which they spring we 
tend . . .  to put the form er in the place of the latter and make them
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the object of our considerations. . . . Instead of a science of realities 
we only practice ideological analysis.”60
Durkheim explicitly includes material-technical systems (e.g., 
houses, traffic networks) among things (or social facts) because we 
should consider them to be of a “moral nature, even though they have 
their basis in physical nature, too.”61 In the meantime, sociologists have 
largely come to prefer going from images of images to images of 
things. Theoretical focus is on signs to the extent that they signify signs. 
And then come these deceptively intelligent microelectronic machines, 
who can themselves manipulate signs and symbols, think and talk, even 
develop theories, and they demand theoretical attention.
Machines will think when people come to believe they think. There 
is little chance to settle the problem of whether they actually think (or 
act) like human beings, and should therefore be treated analytically 
like social actors, empirically, just as the issue of humans being merely 
“a mass of cells and things” is not an empirical matter. MacCormac, in 
observing that “[mjetaphorical personification, which has probably 
existed since the advent of human speech, has become extensive 
among computer scientists and everyday users,” also draws attention 
to the demonic quality of the phenomenon: “Primitive man often 
personified natural objects by giving them divine status; perhaps we 
have shifted the deification from nature to technology.”62 The new 
sociologists of technology I have cited have not shown that people 
actually treat computers as actors in the sense of sustaining some form 
of social relationship with them. Their findings rather point to an 
ongoing process of change in the forms and meanings of social 
relationships occasioned by committing human activities to machin­
ery. In the case of computers, this process may be particularly 
dramatic or obvious.63 For sociology, it seems to me, the question is 
whether there are good reasons to justify commitments to technical 
artifacts as actors conceptually—and thereby to underwrite the defini- 
lional powers of technological institutions and protagonists.
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I low Io "skill the cat’’? Not wishing to resort to pure polemics or to 
dogma, 1 suggest, regarding the “actorship” of advanced technical 
artifacts, a kind of “defensive agnosticism” (MacKay). In the mean­
time, one could try to move closer, sociologically, to what machines 
actually do and how this is achieved—epistemically and technically, 
not metaphorically. So-called thinking machines can be conceived of 
as one class of machines among many others. One has only to realize, 
conceptually, that all machines share in and control our actions, not 
only thinking machines. Without belatedly mystifying historically 
older machines, this strategy saves us from assigning human capabil­
ities to computers any differently than to clocks or sailing ships. 
Analyzing the concept of the “responsibility of things” in Anglo- 
Saxon law and its Roman and Germanic roots, Oliver Wendell Holmes 
noted that, while anything moving is traditionally held to be particu­
larly alive, ships are considered “the most living of inanimate things.” 
And he observes, “It is only by supposing the ship to have been 
treated as if endowed with personality that the arbitrary seeming 
peculiarities of the maritime law can be made intelligible, and on that 
supposition, they at once become consistent and logical.”64
Conclusion
The advent of electronic computational machinery has doubtless 
produced immense cultural perturbations and contributes to a redis­
covery of a world of enchantment where older sociologies saw major 
sources of rationalization and disenchantment. It has also given 
momentum to a project of “revising sociology’s concept of the actor,” 
explicitly or unwittingly put forward in otherwise divergent sociolog­
ical approaches. Appeals to language conventions and beliefs of those 
who make and use technical artifacts, conscious attempts not to 
insulate sociological discourse from public debate, and proposals to 
use the images of technology “out there” as conceptual resources play 
important roles in this undertaking. One may look forward to the 
m anner in which this program is carried further and to the way AI 
machines evolve as either butterflies or bats of a sociology devoted to 
technology.®
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Another program would be to look out, in the first place, not for the 
stories that people, including computer scientists, tell us about 
machines—“technology as text”—but for what people do with ma­
chines, and machines with people—silently. In other words, “technol­
ogy as a body of practices.” O f course, we have to invent a language 
for talking about these practices sociologically. Jonathan Swift’s solu­
tion to the meta-problem (and to kindle cole) of just “carryfing] 
around such things as are necessary to express [this particular] 
business at hand” may work with the technology stories people tell us 
but hardly with the doings of computer systems or nuclear installa­
tions or gene-splicing equipment.66
Machines represent actions. But those ensembles of most minimal 
and trivial of actions they perform, actions invented because they 
could not be performed within our bodies in similar quantity and with 
similar speed and precision, are better conceived as part of collective 
human practices than as a society of homunculi in their own right. For 
better or worse, machines—and particularly computers—act against 
or for us. Attributing to them sentience, or “life,” of one kind or 
another is inevitable as long as they cannot be totally disembodied. 
Attributing to them “symmetry" as “actors,” it seems to me, would be 
warranted once this has been achieved and once they start “talking 
hack” in a discourse that deserves to be called existential—if not 
moral.
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